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What is the point of constitutional government in the United States of 
America? It is the eventual redemption in history of the principles of 
our founding document. I do not mean the written Constitution of 
1787. I mean the Declaration of Independence of 1776. American 
constitutionalism is and must be a commitment to the promises the 
Declaration makes about our future as a people. Our country sprang 
forth from a revolution in political and social structure. The 
Declaration explains the point of that revolution, and hence the point of 
our constitutional enterprise. 
Abraham Lincoln understood this well. At Gettysburg he told his 
audience "[f]our score and seven years ago, our fathers brought forth 
on this continent, a new nation."(2) Eighty seven years before 1863 is 
not 1775, the date of Concord and Lexington, but 1776, the date of the 
Declaration of Independence. The new nation, Lincoln explained, was 
"conceived in Liberty."(3) But it was "dedicated to [a] proposition."(4) 
That proposition was the Declaration's declaration "that all men are 
created equal."(5) This, Lincoln said, was the most profound meaning 
of the Revolution and of the new nation it brought forth.(6) 
Shortly before Lincoln took the oath of office in 1861, he addressed an 
audience at Independence Hall in Philadelphia, where the Declaration 
was debated and signed. When Lincoln spoke several southern states 
had already seceded; more would soon follow.(7) Arguing for the 
preservation of the Union, Lincoln asked what principles the country 
stood for as a whole. "I have often inquired of myself," Lincoln mused, 
"what great principle or idea it was that kept this Confederacy so long 
together."(8) The Union, he said, was not kept together by "the mere 
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matter of the separation of the colonies from the mother land."(9) It was 
kept together by the ideas in the Declaration, ideas that did not simply 
give liberty to Americans, "but hope to the world for all future 
time."(10) The Declaration, Lincoln argued, "gave promise that in due 
time the weights should be lifted from the shoulders of all men, and 
that all should have an equal chance."(11) 
For many, the Civil War began as a fight over Union; northerners 
claimed that the point of the war was to preserve the Union. Even 
Lincoln himself once said that if he could preserve the Union with 
slavery he would do it.(12) Standing at Gettysburg he no longer said 
this: Lincoln argued that the Civil War was not about the preservation 
of the Union for its own sake. The Civil War, he claimed, was a test of 
the national soul, a test of the spirit of the American Revolution, a test 
to see "whether ... any nation so conceived and dedicated"(13) to the 
proposition contained in the Declaration "can long endure."(14) 
The Declaration is our constitution. It is our constitution because it 
constitutes us, constitutes us as a people "conceived in liberty, and 
dedicated to a proposition." Long before the United States had a 
written Constitution it was already constituted, already dedicated, as an 
ongoing social and political project. It was constituted and dedicated by 
We the People, constituted and dedicated by a promise we made to 
ourselves in our Declaration. Courts today do not hold the Declaration 
to be part of the Constitution; they do not read the text of the 
Declaration as if its clauses had the force of law, in the way they read 
the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause. Yet there is no 
text that is more a part of our Constitution -- or our constitution as a 
people -- than the Declaration. Without its ideals our written 
Constitution would be an empty shell; without its ideals we would not 
be a nation "conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that 
all men are created equal."(15) 
The Declaration is our constitution, the constitution that our 
Constitution exists to serve. Lincoln once said that the Declaration is an 
"apple of gold"(16) framed in a "picture of silver,"(17) which is our 
written Constitution.(18) His metaphor comes from the Book of 
Proverbs, which tells us that "[a] word fitly spoken is like apples of 
gold in pictures of silver."(19) The Declaration, with its promise of 
equal liberty for all "was the word, `fitly spoken,' which has proved an 
`apple of gold' to us. The Union and the Constitution are the picture of 
silver subsequently framed around it."(20) This is their right relation. 
"The picture was made not to conceal or destroy the apple, but to adorn 
and preserve it. The picture was made for the apple, not the apple for 
the picture."(21) 
In these few words Lincoln explained the point of our Constitution. 
The Constitution exists to fulfil the promises made by the Declaration; 
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it provides a legal and political framework through which those 
promises can be redeemed in history. Thus, if we want to understand 
the meaning of the Constitution, we must understand the meaning of 
those promises. The Constitution creates a structure of government; but 
the Declaration tells us why governments are instituted. Our 
Constitution is a living document; but the Declaration explains the 
reason that it lives. The Constitution is a body of law; but the promises 
contained in the Declaration are its soul. 
The Declaration makes promises, promises that have yet to be fulfilled. 
It tells us that things are true-- and self-evidently true-- that are not yet 
true at all. It declares that all people are created equal; yet many people 
still live under the yoke of inequality. It says that all people are 
endowed by their Creator with inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness; yet these rights are alienated every day by the rich 
and powerful. It says that to secure these rights, governments are 
instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; 
yet people still live under unjust governments, unjust laws, and unjust 
social conditions to which they have never consented. 
What was the point of saying things, which were not true in 1776 and 
are still not true even today? What is the point of declaring them to be 
true? To declare these things are true is to make a promise and a 
prophecy. It makes a promise to ourselves and to future generations 
that someday what we declare to be true will be true. It makes a 
prophecy that someday the promises we make will be redeemed; if not 
by us, then by those who come after us. The Declaration is a prophecy 
of redemption, that someday "every valley shall be exalted, and every 
mountain and hill laid low, the crooked straight and the rough places 
plain."(22) It even tells us how its prophecies will be fulfilled. Listen to 
the words of the Declaration: "[W]henever any Form of Government 
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter 
or abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on 
such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them 
shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."(23) We 
rebelled against Great Britain to create a new government. That new 
government was imperfect, as all governments are. We the People 
retain the right to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government, 
government that better realizes the promises we made in the 
Declaration. So we have done before. So we shall do again. 
The Declaration declares, calls out to us: Remember what they did 
there. Remember what we did there. And let us do this thing again, 
until the prophecy is fulfilled, the promises redeemed. 
To understand the meaning of the Constitution, we must understand the 
promises that we made to ourselves in our Declaration. And to 
understand those promises, we must understand who we are and where 
we came from. We must understand a central fact about ourselves: We 
are the children of a revolution. That revolution continues, in ever new 
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forms and guises, to this very day. 
The American Revolution was not merely a political revolution. It was 
also a social revolution. When we threw off the government of Great 
Britain, we threw off a form of society as well.(24) The American 
revolution was a revolution against monarchy, but monarchy was both 
a form of governance and a structure of social relations. For the 
revolutionary generation, monarchy meant more than simply the 
existence of a King. The King sat at the top of an elaborate system of 
social hierarchy with intricate gradations of social rank that established 
and maintained social betters and social inferiors. Monarchy was a 
status hierarchy-- it featured and fostered elaborate social meanings of 
superiority and inferiority that helped foster a structure of social power 
and that made this hierarchy of status seem normal, natural and just.(25) 
Monarchy was less a form of government than a technology of social 
power. It was a system of social rank, and rank had its privileges, both 
material and social. 
The high-handedness of the King of England is the object of much of 
the Declaration's complaints, but behind these complaints lies a still 
greater objection: an indictment of an entire social system and a social 
structure that gave special esteem and social power to those judged 
noble and denied status and power to the rest. Monarchy was a world 
of corruption and cronyism, in which the favored few were given 
privileges because of their social connections to the King and their 
place in the social hierarchy. In place of this system the revolutionaries 
hoped to establish a new realm of republican citizens, who recognized 
no King or nobility, but who were equal in political and social rank. 
This rejection of a system of social hierarchy is the point of the 
Declaration's famous statement: "We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal."(26) This truth was hardly self-
evident in 1776; many people believed that human beings were by 
nature born unequal, and that the nobility were a special kind of people, 
superior in skills, intelligence, and temperament to the common rabble.
(27) The natural inequality of human beings and the special nature of 
those judged noble is an old idea in human history, reflected in the very 
term "gentleman," from the Latin "gens" or "kind," suggesting a man of 
a special kind, different from ordinary folk.(28) More than once people 
have taken the world as they find it as proof and justification for the 
inequality of human beings. The Declaration denied this: it asked us to 
look beyond the social structures we live in and to understand how the 
norms of a society can disguise injustice and oppression, make the false 
seem true and the true seem false. 
The revolutionary ethos sought to disestablish unjust social hierarchy 
that disguised itself as natural and normal and justified the found 
inequality of human beings as the natural order of the world. The 
nobility were granted special privileges both by law and by custom; 
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their superior merits were apparent on the face of things, in their style, 
their dress, their education, their manners, and their culture. Their 
superiority in all things went without saying; they even prided 
themselves on their condescension to the lower orders. Condescension 
was a social virtue, the beneficent attitude of social superiors towards 
people who knew their place.(29) 
The revolutionary generation sought to rid America of this social 
hierarchy, a social structure complete with an elaborate set of social 
meanings of superiority and inferiority, complete with its own vision of 
human merit and its own conception of "the best and the brightest." 
The desire to smash this social hierarchy, alter its social meanings, and 
disestablish its unjust social structure was the true radicalism of the 
American Revolution, a radicalism so successful that we no longer 
remember monarchy's ubiquitous forms and force in everyday life.(30) 
Hoping to stem the growth of monarchical privileges in the new nation, 
the framers of the 1787 Constitution forbade the states and the federal 
government from granting titles of nobility.(31) Yet so effective was the 
social transformation brought on by the American Revolution that 
these clauses soon became superfluous, a distant echo of a world and a 
form of social inequality entirely strange to us. To understand the 
meaning of the Declaration today, we must remember that forgotten 
world. We must look back to the Titles of Nobility Clauses and to the 
excoriation of monarchy in the Declaration to remind ourselves that the 
revolutionaries who fought for liberty and equality sought to change 
not only the forms of government, but also the structure of society. 
The revolutionaries' demand for social equality was an ideal. It was not 
completely achieved in the years after the Revolution, nor did the 
revolutionary generation understand how great a social transformation 
true social equality would require. Few thought the idea of social 
equality should apply to women, or to slaves, and many did not even 
think it should apply to white men who lacked property. Even after the 
Revolution, prosperous families in both the North and South tended to 
think of themselves as a natural ruling elite, failing to see that their 
aristocracy of "natural" merit disguised yet another form of social 
hierarchy.(32) Ironically, they too would be resented by a later 
generation of ordinary Americans who regarded them with the same 
degree of distrust as they had regarded the King and the English 
nobility.(33) 
But the limitations of the revolutionary generation are beside the point. 
What is important about their ideal of social equality is precisely that it 
was an ideal: It was something that future generations could look to, 
something that they could employ to critique the social inequalities of 
their own time, something that they could invoke against previous 
generations who had realized it only partially and incompletely. 
The struggle against the social structure of monarchy is the deepest 
Page 5 of 16Untitled
10/9/2010http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/articles/declar1.htm
meaning of the American revolution -- a fight for political equality that 
was also a fight for social equality, a revolution in social as well as 
political structure, a transformation in mores and manners as well as in 
the organs of representative government. But the call for social equality 
did not cease with the Revolution. It continues even in our own time. 
The revolutionary generation set loose a set of social forces that would 
prove more lasting and more powerful than any of them could have 
dreamed. 
The world of monarchs and nobles has long since dissolved. Yet the 
revolutionary opposition to unjust social hierarchy has not subsided. 
That original call for social equality has reverberated again and again 
throughout American history. It underlies many of the most important 
social movements in American history; from the original 
revolutionaries to the Jacksonians, the Free Labor movement, the 
abolitionists, the Grange movement, the women's movement in its 
various incarnations, the Labor movement, the Populists, the New 
Dealers, the Civil Rights movement, and the Gay Rights movement of 
our own time. Each of these social movements has carried on, in its 
own way, the cause of the American Revolution -- the demand for the 
disestablishment of forms of unjust social status and social hierarchy, 
the demand for full recognition that all of us are equal and equal 
citizens. 
  
The Declaration and Democratic Culture 
The ultimate goal of our constitutional order is not merely to produce 
democratic procedures but a democratic culture: a culture in which all 
citizens can participate and feel they have a stake, a culture in which 
unjust social privileges and status hierarchies have been disestablished. 
Democracy is more than a matter of fair legal process. It is a feature of 
social organization, of social structure. Democracy inheres not only in 
procedural mechanisms like universal suffrage but in cultural modes 
like dress, language, manners and behavior. Political egalitarianism 
must be nourished by cultural egalitarianism. A culture of democracy 
must include both legal rights and institutions as well as cultural 
predicates for the exercise of those rights and institutions. For example, 
freedom of speech is formally guaranteed by legal doctrines, but it is 
even more important to democracy that we have a culture that respects 
and tolerates freedom of speech. We must have not only legal tolerance 
by governments but social tolerance by private citizens who respect the 
rights of people with whom they disagree.(34) 
General guarantees of formal equality and liberty are not sufficient to 
produce a truly democratic culture. Rather, social structure itself must 
be altered. This is the lesson we should take from the American 
Revolution. To ensure a democratic culture, we must examine the 
historical forms and methods of social stratification existing in our own 
time. We must ask how law can be used to dismantle them, or, at the 
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very least, how we can keep law from reinforcing and reproducing 
them. 
Redeeming the promises of the Declaration requires that we understand 
democracy sociologically and historically as well as procedurally. 
Human beings must be freed not only from the power of the state, but 
from the customs and institutions of social hierarchy, and from the 
overweening ambitions of private power. People must have a genuine 
chance to participate in all of the institutions of society that affect their 
lives; these institutions include not only governments but the market 
and the larger culture as well. The social movements that followed the 
American Revolution have always had this dual character-- they have 
sought not only change in forms of state governance, but also changes 
in the structure of society. They understood the important connections 
between political freedom, social status and economic independence. 
When the Jacksonians protested special economic privileges for the 
wealthy, they identified this with "class legislation" that created a new 
class of economic nobility.(35) The populists of the 1890's were deeply 
concerned with the concentration of economic power in private hands 
that occurred in the second half of the 19th century. The labor 
movement and the New Dealers understood that legal rules that 
preserved economic impoverishment and dependence were necessarily 
linked with lack of political and social status.(36) The women's 
movement has always been concerned not only with equal legal rights 
for women, but with the economic status and social position of women 
in the workplace and in the family.(37) The civil rights movement 
sought not only equal opportunity for blacks but also a dismantling of a 
system of social meanings that granted special racial privileges to 
whiteness. 
In short, if we are to realize the promise of the Declaration in our own 
time, we must try to understand the forms of unjust social hierarchy 
that exist in our world and how law and society together conspire to 
maintain these status relationships. We must challenge all of the forms 
of status enforcing state action, not merely those that overtly preserve 
status hierarchy through direct classification. And we must resist all 
attempts by law to reproduce unjust status hierarchies. 
The goal of a democratic culture is a continuous process rather than an 
achievable endstate, for democracies always exist and have existed in 
societies shaped by existing social hierarchies and previous injustices. 
Democracies always live in social conditions partially hostile to the 
attainment of democratic ideals. As Lincoln pointed out, the 
Declaration's Framers well understood that the promises of liberty and 
equality they declared could not fully exist in the world they inhabited. 
They put those promises in that document so that future generations 
could strive to redeem them.(38) The vindication of the principles of the 
Declaration can come only through a transformation of society into a 
truly democratic culture, the kind of society that can produce in reality 
what the Declaration only promised in theory. That is the point of 
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constitutional government: the eventual redemption of American 
democracy, the creation of a government, in Lincoln's words, of the 
people, by the people, and for the people.(39) 
  
Narrative Constitution and Narrative Justification 
  
 
The constitutional theory I have offered here is self-consciously 
organized around a national narrative of redemption. According to this 
story our system of government has a point, a trajectory: It works 
towards the realization in history of the promises made in the 
Declaration of Independence. The narrative of redemption gives 
meaning to the declarations found in our Declaration, and the 
Declaration, in turn, gives meaning to the redemptive narrative. 
Through this story we understand many important social movements in 
American history as working out the meaning of the Declaration, 
engaging in popular uprisings that help to redeem its promises. And 
through this story we understand that we must interpret the 
Constitution in order to further the eventual realization of a democratic 
culture. The story asserts faith in eventual progress for our country, 
even though there have been and will be many detours, retreats, and 
regressions along the way. 
This argument is distinctive in three respects: First, it is a narrative 
argument; second, it is an narrative about redemption; and third, it is an 
argument about the redemption of a people. Let me address each of 
these in turn. 
First, the argument and the form of justification are narrative. 
Narrative justifications help us understand what is happening and what 
we should do by calling upon an existing stock of shared stories about 
ourselves, our past, and our relationship to others. We understand 
ourselves in terms of stories about who we are and how we came to be. 
These stories help us understand the situation we are currently facing 
and the ways we should respond to it. They give us roles to fill and 
obligations to fulfill. Narrative justifications are persuasive when they 
draw upon and make sense in terms of our narratively constituted 
identities. The stories we tell about ourselves are full of normative 
lessons: They explain who we are, where we came from, what we have 
done, what we have yet to do, what we stand for, what promises we 
made to ourselves, what we hope for, what we fear, what we said we 
must never let happen again, and what we said we must make happen 
again. 
We Americans have a narrative that explains the meaning of our 
Constitution: We are the people who broke from Great Britain, fought 
against monarchy, and rebelled against an unjust social hierarchy in 
order to found a democratic culture of equal liberty and social equality. 
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This story about ourselves explains our obligations toward ourselves 
and toward our future. It explains the direction in which we should 
continue our national project; it explains how we should interpret our 
Constitution. 
Second, the argument draws on a story of redemption, a story about the 
eventual fulfillment of promises made long ago. Invoking the past 
might look at first like an appeal to original intention or original 
understanding. However, narratives of redemption use the past in a 
different way than most originalists do. Redemptive stories argue that 
we progress from our origins, which are fallen and unjust, but hold the 
promise of reformation. Over time we free ourselves from the sins and 
inadequacies of the past, and hold ourselves ever more true to those 
best parts that have always been within us. We free ourselves from 
ourselves, and through this freeing we become the selves we deserve to 
be. 
A narrative of redemption worships neither the past nor the present. To 
the contrary: it assumes that we exist, and always have existed, in a 
fallen condition. We live in compromises with the evils of the past, and 
we are compromised by them. The need for redemption means that 
many elements of the past, many features of social structure inherited 
from the past, and many original understandings that reflect that social 
structure, must not be honored but reformed or discarded. The founding 
generation begins the journey, but it has no privileged insight into the 
future. It does not possess the institutional and social imagination to 
grasp what a fully democratic culture would look like. The founding 
generation knows only its own culture. It wrestles with its own 
compromises with history; it can extrapolate only partially from them 
to imagine what the future would be like. 
The revolutionary project of imagining a democratic culture and 
realizing it in history is the work of many generations, not a single 
privileged one. The mistake of originalism as conventionally 
understood is that it takes too seriously the concrete understandings of 
a past generation. It mistakes past compromises with injustice for the 
meaning of justice. It mistakes our fallen condition for our rightful 
condition. 
One might assume then that the argument is simply one of natural law 
or best consequences. But that too is not quite correct. A narrative 
justification does not argue that the Constitution means something 
because this interpretation is the best from the standpoint of liberal 
political theory or economic efficiency. Rather, the Constitution means 
what it means because We the People made a promise in the past to 
ourselves that we strive to fulfill. The promise and the story constitutes 
the people who strive to fulfil the promise and the story. A different 
people with a different history and a set of commitments might have 
made a different promise; the results, although similar in some 
respects, might be very different in others. 
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For example, Gary Jacobsohn has pointed out that major differences in 
the constitutional traditions of the United States and the State of Israel 
are reflected in differences between the American Declaration and the 
Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel.(40) The Israeli 
Declaration affirms that Israel is to be a democratic and a Jewish State. 
The Israeli Declaration arises out of a long history of Jewish 
persecution and a long-held religious narrative of eventual return to a 
Jewish homeland. The Israeli Declaration also involves a redemption 
narrative, but the nature of this redemption is very different from the 
American version. Clearly the trajectory taken by a country with such a 
founding story and such a set of narrative commitments may be very 
different from our own. That is why constitutional government is not 
simply a matter of liberal political theory. Quite the contrary: liberty 
and equality are always realized through the particular history of a 
people; as each is constituted differently, so each will have its own 
constitution.(41) 
The story of redemption is also a story of contingency. The founding 
generation has no privileged authority because the constitutional 
tradition develops in ways that cannot be determined in advance. The 
story of our country is not a Hegelian story in which the oak is already 
contained in the acorn. Contingent events -- wars, waves of 
immigration and settlement, new religions and technologies, economic 
booms and depressions -- all play an enormous role. The future is 
something that we make, with our narrative self understanding as our 
goad and guide. In every generation it is given to us to redeem the 
promises of the Declaration in ever new ways. The revolutionaries who 
signed the Declaration could not have known about the women's 
movement, the Civil War, the populists, the New Deal, or the civil 
rights movement. Yet all of these "alterings and abolishings" of 
government have been folded into the story of the redemption of the 
American Constitution, a redemption whose full contours could not be 
known in advance. One might say that the meaning of the Constitution 
is revealed to us as we take upon ourselves the burden of redemption. 
But it is more correct to say that we reveal it to ourselves through our 
actions. Its meaning is not foreordained, but is created as we commit 
ourselves to the project of redemption, meeting new and unexpected 
circumstances as they arise. 
The story is contingent in another way as well. A narrative justification 
does not claim that the eventual redemption is assured. It claims only 
that we should strive to achieve it. It does not deny that we have often 
strayed from the path of redemption. Indeed, it repeatedly calls 
attention to this fact. It claims only that we should recognize the path 
and return to it. The narrative is prophecy, not fortune telling. It does 
not say that redemption will occur without any effort on our part; it 
says that we must make the story true. As Lincoln explained, the 
Declaration was meant "to set up a standard maxim for free society, 
which could be familiar to all, and revered by all; constantly looked to, 
constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly attained, 
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constantly approximated, and thereby constantly spreading and 
deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness and value of life 
to all people of all colors everywhere."(42) The Declaration tells a story 
that we can take into our hearts and live by, and by living it, we can 
hasten the day when the story will become true. 
I have argued that we should interpret the Constitution in order to 
fulfill the promises that we Americans made in our Declaration, 
promises that are to be redeemed in history, and that we should 
understand many of our most important social movements as a 
continuation of the original social revolution against unjust hierarchy 
that began with the American revolutionaries. I have argued that we, 
the generations before us, and the generations after us, have a role to 
play in the furtherance of this great project of constitutional 
redemption. 
But, one might object, this story is just that -- a story. It takes certain 
features of the history of our country as morally salient and weaves 
them together into a coherent narrative of redemption. But if it is just a 
story, why does it have any moral force? Why is the promise made in 
the Declaration of Independence our promise, and why is the burden of 
redemption our burden? 
This brings me to my third and final point. The narrative argument is a 
claim about Americans as a people. Narrative arguments are appeals to 
collective memory -- a stock of stories that bind people together and 
make them a people. Nations, peoples, and collectivities of all kinds 
see themselves as existing over time and across generations because 
they understand themselves in terms of stories about who they are and 
how they came to be. For example, every year at the Passover Seder 
Jews tell the story of how they left Egypt. This story unites the Jews 
who live today with those who lived thousands of years ago. We 
Americans tell each other stories about how we rebelled from Great 
Britain and established a new republic based on principles of liberty 
and equality. The stories that people tell themselves about who they are 
and how they came to be connect the past with the present, older 
generations with newer ones. These stories are constitutional stories -- 
constitutive narratives around which and through which people can 
imagine themselves as a people, with shared hopes, memories, goals, 
aspirations and ambitions. 
Constitutional stories construct collective subjects with collective 
destinies who engage in collective activities. Constitutional stories bind 
together human beings existing in different times and places as one 
people. They allow people to see the actions and the ambitions, the 
hopes and the achievements of people who lived long ago as their 
actions and ambitions, as their hopes and achievements. So Jews living 
today tell themselves that they were slaves in Egypt, that God brought 
them forth from the house of bondage with a strong hand and an 
outstretched arm, with signs and wonders. In the same way, Americans 
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identify with the achievements of the revolutionaries and of the 
founding generation who wrote and ratified the Constitution. The story 
of constitutional redemption allows Americans to say that we ended 
slavery, that we expanded political and civil rights, that we struggled to 
make this country a promise of hope to the entire world. The people 
who live today did not literally do these things; indeed, some of their 
ancestors probably opposed many of these reforms. But that is beside 
the point. Our narrative understanding of ourselves as part of a greater 
whole, collectively working towards the fulfillment of the principles of 
the Declaration, allows us to identify with those who fought for 
redemption in the past. We can see their struggle as our struggle. This 
vision of ourselves as part of them and them as part of us gives the 
story its moral force. Our collective identity creates hopes and dreams, 
obligations and responsibilities, desires and promises to fulfill in time. 
We are motivated and moved by the story because we accept the 
collective identity that accompanies the story. We identify with the 
story because the story identifies us. In short, the story is binding on us 
because it is our story. 
When I speak of the promises we made to ourselves in the Declaration 
of Independence, I am referring to nothing other than the collective 
memory that binds us together as a people. The story of our rebellion 
against monarchy is our constitutional story. It is constitutional in two 
senses of the word: It constitutes us as We the People of the United 
States, and it explains the point of our constitutional system of 
government. 
Constitutional stories constitute us as a people with a purpose and a 
trajectory: They remind us what we have done in the past and therefore 
what we should be doing today. They explain to us where we have 
been and therefore where we should be going. As we did before, so 
shall we do again. As we fought for liberty and equality before, so shall 
we fight again. Constitutional stories give meaning to our existence as 
a people; they offer us models for action, goals for fulfillment, heroic 
acts to imitate, ambitions to aspire to, promises to redeem. 
A story like this is not "just a story." You live in it, and it lives in you. 
It is true for you because it is part of you, because you see yourself as 
part of it. If you are committed to a narrative in this way, it is not just a 
story, but a just story, an appropriate story. And if you are committed 
to it in this way, it becomes more than a story. It becomes a way of life. 
It becomes a destiny. It becomes a world. 
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